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Introduction
Morality is commonly characterized as a system of rules governed by a categorically binding impartial imperative. As Kant claims, a categorical imperative 'must already be connected (completely a priori) with the concept of the will of a rational being as such'. 1 Such an imperative will, however, be impartial only if the following principle of universalisation (FPU) is analytic:
If an agent 2 (Albert) is categorically bound to act in accord with a maxim M then every other agent (e.g., Brenda) is categorically bound to act in accord with what M prescribes to Albert.
Kant maintains that
[t]he human being necessarily represents his own existence  [as an end in itself]; so far it is a subjective principle of human actions. But every other rational being also represents his existence in this way consequent on just the same rational ground that also holds for me; thus it is at the same time an objective principle from which, as a supreme practical ground, it must be possible to derive all laws of the will. The practical imperative will therefore be the following: So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means. 3 In other words, Albert is bound to act in accord with Ma: 'Treat Albert's existence as an end in itself', because Ma is connected completely a priori to Albert's concept of himself as an agent. Consequently, not only is Brenda bound to act in accord with Mb: 'Treat Brenda's existence as an end in itself', because 'Mb is connected completely a priori to Brenda's Because the Kantian and Gewirthian arguments for morality share this structure, differences between them can only stem from differences between 'considering humanity in one's person to be an end in itself' and 'considering that one has the generic rights' and/or a normative principle being connected completely a priori with Albert's concept of himself as an agent vs. a normative principle being dialectically necessary for Albert.
Christine Korsgaard portrays Gewirth as maintaining that you are rationally committed … to valuing certain features of yourself … [so] … you must value the same features in … [others] … on pain of contradiction. Since I must regard my humanity as a source of value, I must in the name of consistency regard your humanity that way as well. So I must value the things that you value. Or, to put it another way since I think that my humanity is what makes my desires into normative reasons, I must on pain of contradiction suppose that the humanity of others makes their desires into normative reasons as well. 7 However, while 4 Reason and Morality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978). 5 These are rights to the generic conditions of agency (GCAs), which are conditions needed to be able to act at all or with any general chances of success, regardless of one's purposes. They include life itself, health, and the means to these such as food, clothing and shelter, freedom of action, mental equilibrium sufficient to be able to translate wishes into behaviour, and accurate information (see Gewirth, Reason and Morality, pp. 53-63). A condition is generic if lack of it (either immediately or if prolonged) will have some negative effect on one's ability to act at all or to act successfully, regardless of one's purposes. 6 Something is dialectically necessary for me if I must assent to it on pain of failing to understand what it is for me to be an agent (hence implicitly denying that I am an agent). 'It is dialectically necessary for me to do Z' is not equivalent to 'I necessarily do Z'. The latter implies that I cannot be an agent and not do Z. The former states that I ought to do Z on pain of denying that I am an agent, which implies that I can be an agent and not do Z 7 Christine Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 133. To be precise, she says that 'Gewirth, for instance makes an argument that looks like this in Reason and Morality ' (ibid.) [c]onsistency  can force me to acknowledge that your desires have the status of reasons for you, in exactly the same way that mine do for me it does not force me to share in your reasons, or make your humanity normative for me. 8 This is because Gewirth tries to show that private reasons with normative force for an agent give the agent some reason to take the private reasons of other agents into account by arguing that the agent's private reasons 'logically commit her to taking other people's reasons into account  starting from the assumption that reasons for action are private' 9 . But on this assumption, even if consistency would force me to take your reasons into account  it would do it in the wrong way. It would show that I have an obligation to myself to treat you in ways that respect the value which I place on you. It would show that I have duties with respect to you, about you, but not that there are things that I owe to you. 10 However, 'reasons are not private, but public in their very essence'.
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But once it is established that reasons are essentially public it will be easy to show how we can get someone who acknowledges the value of his own humanity to see that he has moral obligations.
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To show that reasons are essentially public, Korsgaard appeals to Wittgenstein's argument that it is impossible for one to have a language that is in principle incommunicable to anybody else, which she claims shows that
[t]o talk about values and meanings is to talk … about relations we have with ourselves and one another. The normative demands of meaning and reason are … demands that we make on ourselves and each other. 13 So, if I hear sounds uttered by you as words, I acknowledge that you are someone. In acknowledging that I can hear them, I acknowledge that I am someone.
Suppose that we are strangers and that you are tormenting me, and suppose that I call upon you to stop. I say: 'How would you like it if someone did that to you?' … [Recognizing that I am someone, you would] … realize that you would not merely dislike it, you would resent it. You would think that the other has a reason to stop, more, that he has an obligation to stop. And that obligation would spring from your own objection to what he does to you. You make yourself an end for others; you make yourself a law to them. But if you are a law to others in so far as you are just human, just someone, then the humanity of others is also a law for you. By making you think these thoughts, I force you to acknowledge the value of my humanity, and I obligate you to act in a way that respects it.
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In response, I argue that Korsgaard's claims about the deficiencies of the Gewirthian argument are unfounded because the argument she attacks is a straw man; that her own argument for moral obligation is misdirected and unnecessary; that the a priori nature of the Gewirthian argument is essentially Kantian; and that because Kantians recognize that the Principle of Hypothetical Imperatives is categorically binding they must accept Gewirth's PGC as the supreme practical principle.
Korsgaard provides no evidence for her characterization of the Gewirthian argument. So, because she claims to derive her objection from her understanding of Williams, in Part One, I examine Williams' critique of the argument he constructs from Gewirth and agree that it is sound. However, Williams does not address the Gewirthian argument.
So, in Part Two, I outline my own reconstruction, 16 which Gewirth endorsed. 17 The argument is valid if, and only if, the formal moral principle (FMP) (a corollary of the FPUthe FPU being equivalent to 'It is dialectically necessary for agents to treat the dialectically necessary normative commitments of any agent as their own') Act in accord with the dialectically necessary normative commitments of all agents, and the Principle of Instrumental Reason or Hypothetical Imperatives (PHI), If doing X (or having) Y is necessary for Albert to pursue/achieve a goal E, then Albert ought to do X (or act to obtain Y) or give up pursuit of E, are both dialectically necessary for Albert, and I argue that they are.
In Part Three, I translate this into Korsgaard's terms. The Gewirthian argument does not contend that Albert's private reasons 'logically commit [him] to taking other people's reasons into account  starting from the assumption that reasons for action are private'. It presumes neither that reasons for action are necessarily private nor that they are necessarily public, but demonstrates that dialectically necessary normative commitments, those that are categorically binding on agents (and only such commitments) provide necessarily public reasons for action. Consistency with the idea that Albert is an agent as such requires him to treat Brenda's dialectically normative commitments as his own. It follows from the nature of the argument for this (for the FMP) that Albert's duty not to interfere with Brenda's possession of the GCAs is a duty he owes to the particular agent that Brenda is for the reason that she, just like Albert, possesses agency (humanity in Korsgaard's terms) in her person.
In Part Four, I contend that Korsgaard's argument for Stage II of the Kantian project is not an argument for moral obligation at all. What it addresses is why Albert must treat Brenda as being human (an agent) if she behaves like an agent. If Korsgaard's own argument for Stage I establishes that Albert must consider that the reason why he is a law to Brenda is simply that he is an agent, then nothing more is needed to establish that Albert must consider Brenda to be a law to him. This follows purely logically, Williams agrees, and Korsgaard's argument for Stage II presupposes that this is so.
In Part Five, I argue that the Kantian argument for Stage I is sound only if understood in Gewirthian terms, and Kantians cannot maintain (as they do) that the PHI is an aspect of the categorical imperative and not accept that the PGC is the categorical imperative.
I conclude that, in attempting to demonstrate a strictly priori connection between morality and the concept of agency as such, the Gewirthian project is essentially Kantian, but that it is only true that Albert must, in these terms, consider that humanity/agency in his person is an end in itself if this means that he must consider that he has the generic rights.
Part One: Williams' Objection to 'Gewirth'
Williams constructs the following argument.
Since I necessarily want my basic freedom, 18 I must be opposed to courses of action that would remove it. Hence I cannot agree to any arrangement of things by which others would have the right to remove my basic freedom. So, when I reflect on what arrangement of things I basically need, I see that I must claim a right to my basic freedom. In effect, I must lay it down as a rule that they respect my freedom. I claim this right solely because I am a rational agent with purposes. But if this fact alone is the basis of my claim, then a similar fact must equally be the basis of such a claim by others. … In moving from my need for freedom to 'they ought not to interfere with me', I must equally move from their need to 'I ought not to interfere with them '. 19 He claims that the very last stepthat if in my case rational agency alone is the ground of the right of non-interference, then it must be so in the case of other peopleis certainly sound … [It] is brought into play simply by because or in virtue of … . That must be so if enough is indeed enough. 20 So, if the argument goes wrong it must be at an earlier stepwhich is 'when I first assert my supposed right'. 21 The mistake is to hold that 'I must be opposed to courses of action that would remove my basic freedom because I necessarily want/need basic freedom' entails 'I must consider that I have a right to my basic freedom'.
He reasons as follows. That I (Albert) necessarily want basic freedom or need it for whatever purposes I want to pursue does provide me with a categorically binding reason to oppose interference with my basic freedom; but it does not provide me with a categorically binding reason to oppose interference with Brenda's basic freedom. For it to do so, I must necessarily want Brenda to have basic freedom or necessarily need her to have it for my chosen purposes. But I do not necessarily want or need Brenda to have basic freedom. Of course, Brenda also has a categorically binding reason to oppose interference with her basic freedom. However, my wants or needs 'are not necessarily reasons for another's doing anything' 22 and vice versa.
Williams is not saying that it is unintelligible for me to 'prescribe' to Brenda (on the grounds that I necessarily want basic freedom, or categorically need it) that she ought not to interfere with my basic freedom. Indeed, he says that this 'prescription' is 'reasonably related' to me. He adds that if I must consider that I have a right to basic freedom on such grounds, I should also prescribe that I have a right to all my particular purposes, because I want to achieve them 'as much as anything else  [and] my need for basic freedom was itself derived from that kind of want'. 24 Furthermore, it is unsound to infer from the true statement that I may not grant others a right to interfere with my basic freedom that I must consider that I have a right to basic freedom, because I might refuse to make claims about anyone's rights in relation to my having basic freedom. 25 All of this is sound; but Williams' construction is not the Gewirthian argument!
Part Two: The Gewirthian Argument
Albert, as an agent, does something (X) voluntarily in order to pursue some purpose (or purposes) E that he chooses to pursue. The argument proceeds from Albert's internal viewpoint through the following steps:
(1)
In choosing to do X for E, I (Albert) necessarily care about E enough to move me to do something to bring about E = I necessarily proactively want E = I necessarily attach a value to E sufficient to motivate me to pursue E. (2) 'If doing X (or having Y) is necessary for me to pursue or achieve E then I ought to do X (or I ought to act to ensure that I obtain or keep Y), or give up my pursuit of E'.
This is the Principle of Instrumental Reason or Hypothetical Imperatives (PHI). (3)
It is dialectically necessary for me to accept the PHI: otherwise I fail to understand that as an agent I am trying to achieve E voluntarily by doing X.
dialectically necessary for me to accept the self-referring prescription, SROa, 'I ought to defend my having the GCAs, for my purposes, whatever they might be'. SROa can be expressed in a number of equivalent ways; e.g., 'I categorically instrumentally ought to defend my having the GCAs' = 'I ought to defend my having the GCAs, unless (and only unless) I am willing to suffer generic damage to my ability to act' 27 = 'I ought to oppose unwilled interference with my having the GCAs' = 'I ought to oppose interference with my having the GCAs, unless (and only unless) interference is not against my will'. I will formulate the statement that SROa is dialectically necessary for me (Albert) as {SROa} Albert.
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(5) Because I generically need the GCAs to achieve any end, I will not be able to defend having them if Brenda prevents me from having them. Therefore, {SROa} Albert  {Brenda ought not to interfere with my having the GCAs against my will} Albert = {BRO} Albert  {I have a right to non-interference with my having the GCAs} Albert = {AR} Albert.
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This concludes Stage A of the argument. By the logical principle of universalization (LPU) 32 operating on 'I am an agent  AR' within '{AR} Albert  {I am an agent  AR} Albert ', {Brenda is an agent  I 27 This condition is expressed this way because not all GCAs are necessary for the very possibility of action. Some are necessary only for general chances of successful action. And even the former are subject to having degrees of impact in the sense that their absence may have more or less immediate effects on the possibility of action. 28 A proposition in face brackets is dialectically necessary, the subscript indicating for whom it is dialectically necessary. 29 The generic rights are argued to be positive as well as negative; i.e., they are argued to be rights to assistance as well as rights to non-interference. For convenience, I shall, in the main, only follow the track of the claims as claims to negative rights. The claims as positive rights are not derived from the claims to negative rights, but are parallel to them: I need assistance to secure my having the GCAs when I cannot do so by my own unaided efforts as much as I need non-interference. (See Gewirth, Reason and Morality, pp. 228-229.) 30 See Gewirth, Reason and Morality, p, 110. 31 What the ASA purports to show is that if my being an agent is my dialectically necessary ratio cognoscendi for my claim to have AR then it is dialectically necessary for me to accept that it is also the ratio essendi for my having AR. 32 This may be stated as 'If the fact that A has  is sufficient to infer that A has , then the fact that B has  is sufficient to infer that B has '. The principle depends merely on the meaning of 'sufficient to infer'. In its application here, 'having ' is 'being an agent'; and 'having ' is 'having the generic rights'.
ought not to interfere with Brenda's having the GCAs, unless she is willing to suffer generic damage to her ability to act} Albert  {Brenda has a right to non-interference with her GCAs} Albert (8)
By the LPU, {All agents have a right to non-interference with their having the GCAs) all agents = {The PGC} all agents
This concludes Stage B of the argument.
Stage A provides Albert with two reasons for opposing interference with his having the GCAs (for acting in accordance with SROa). One reason is that he categorically instrumentally needs the GCAs in order to pursue/achieve his chosen purposes. Williams and Korsgaard portray Albert as reasoning solely in terms of this reason. In effect, they interpret the Gewirthian claim that SROa is dialectically necessary for Albert as the claim that Albert categorically instrumentally (for his purposes) ought to defend his having the GCAs. But this is not the Gewirthian claim, which is the thoroughly Kantian one that Albert fails to understand what it is for him to be an agent (to possess agency in his person) if he does not agree that he ought to structure his practical reasoning in accordance with the PHI, and hence with SROa.
So, it is irrelevant to the validity of the Gewirthian argument that Albert does not necessarily want Brenda to pursue/achieve her chosen purposes or that he does not categorically need her to have the GCAs in order to achieve his chosen purposes. It must be shown that {SROa} Albert does not entail {BR} Albert.
According to the sequence I have outlined, {SROa} Albert {BRO  AR} Albert.  {I (Albert) am an agent  BRO/AR} Albert. {Brenda is an agent  BR} Albert  {BR} Albert.
Williams cannot question consistently that {I (Albert) am an agent  AR} Albert  {BR} Albert , because he says that 'I (Albert) am an agent  AR' entails 'BR (if Brenda is an agent)'. And he is not concerned to deny that the PHI is dialectically necessary for Albert (which would be tantamount to denying that there are any reasons for action at all); and {PHI} Albert  {SROa} Albert . So, the critical step for Williams is from {SROa} Albert to {AR} Albert.
There is no need to examine here all the ways in which this step has been attacked and can be defended. This is because it is not necessary to employ this step to demonstrate {BR} Albert.
The fact of the matter is that the Gewirthian argument rests on nothing more and nothing less than coupling {PHI} Albert (which, conjoined with the idea of a GCA, yields {SROa} Albert ) with the dialectical necessity of the FMP ('Act in accord with the dialectically necessary normative commitments of all agents'). The first challenge claims that 'Albert is an agent' means 'Albert is a member of the class of beings who necessarily value the purposes Albert has chosen', whereas 'Brenda is an agent' means 'Brenda is a member of the class of beings who necessarily value the purposes Brenda has chosen'. However, each of these classes necessarily has only one member. Consequently, my arguments for {FMP} Albert fail, because in these terms {Ma} Albert does not entail {Mb} Brenda . From Albert's dialectically necessary point of view, he is the only possible agent (as is Brenda from her dialectically necessary point of view).
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The second challenge claims that what is ascribed in 'Albert is an agent' and 'Brenda is an agent' is only the same if to think of Albert and Brenda as agents is to think of them as beings lacking any of the particular characteristics that make them the particular agents that they are. As such, while the FMP is dialectically necessary for Albert and Brenda thought of as 'rational agents and no more', there is no way 'of being a rational agent and no more', 35 so this fact does not provide either Brenda or Albert (if they are real agents) with any reasons to act.
Both of these challenges fail because the following principle of reflective judgment (PRJ) is analytic from Albert's internal perspective as a real agent.
If Albert thinks of himself as the unique being who necessarily values his own chosen purposes (as the particular agent that he is) then he must also think of himself as a member of the class of beings who stand in the universal relation to their own chosen purposes of necessarily valuing them (as a member of the generic class of agents); and, conversely, if he thinks of himself as a member of the generic class of agents, then he must also think of himself as the particular agent that he is.
In essence, Williams alleges that the Kantian-Gewirthian project of trying to justify a categorically binding impartial principle falls prey to a dilemma: either it can justify categorically binding requirements for real agents at the price of making them not universalisable (alleged Gewirthian route) or it can justify impartial requirements that are categorically binding only on complete abstractions (alleged Kantian route).
However, the Gewirthian argument does not fall prey to this dilemma, because the dilemma does not exist. Albert, as the subject of Gewirthian self-reflection, is neither a pure abstraction nor a being who considers himself the only conceivable addressor and addressee of practical precepts (neither of which construction is intelligible). He is someone whose selfreflective awareness as an agent is governed by the PRJ.
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Part Three: Private and Public Reasons in the Gewirthian Argument As Korsgaard defines an essentially private reason for action, her allegation that the Gewirthian argument operates with the presumption that reasons for action are essentially private has no foundation. The idea that reasons for action are essentially private renders it incoherent to hold, not merely that one agent categorically ought to act for any interests of another, but that it is even possible for one agent to act for any interests of another. Were Gewirthians to make such an assumption, it would be absurd for them to attempt to show, on any grounds whatsoever, that rationality requires agents to take account of any interests of others in deciding how they themselves may act. This, however, does not mean that Gewirthians suppose that reasons for action are essentially public (if an essentially public reason is a necessarily public one), for they do not suppose, nor do they try to show, that every reason for Albert to act is necessarily a reason that Brenda must act in accordance with and vice versa. 37 What they do suppose is that any reasons for action are capable of being treated as public (hence, are not essentially private). This requires only that it be intelligible to imagine that agents are capable of acting for the purposes of others, that agents who have moral, even altruistic, motivations might conceivably exist.
Gewirthians follow Kant unequivocally in holding that if a maxim is to be shown to be categorically binding on Albert then the requirement to act on it must be shown to be connected completely a priori with Albert's idea of himself as an agent, which they interpret to mean that it must be shown that Albert fails to understand what it is for him to be an agent if he does not accept that he ought to act according to the maxim in question. Consequently, the criterion for the Gewirthian dialectically necessary method (CDNM) is I (Albert) may and must accept a maxim if (and only if) my failure to accept it entails that I fail to understand what it is for me to an agent.
The CDNM, which is analytically connected to the idea of a categorical imperative, must be distinguished from the fundamental Gewirthian criterion for normatively rational action (GCRA), which is I (Albert) categorically ought to act on any maxim Ma that is dialectically necessary for me to adopt, and it is not impermissible for me to act on a maxim N only if N is consistent with Ma.
The CDNM does not prohibit Albert, as a rational agent, from acting on maxims that are not dialectically necessary for him. It only prohibits him from appealing to any considerations that are not dialectically necessary for him as premises in the sequence of reasoning purporting to establish a dialectically necessary conclusion for him (either to support or to undermine an inference). So, by the GCRA, unless (and until) some maxims are shown to be dialectically necessary for Albert (with which all rationally permissible maxims for Albert must be consistent), Albert is permitted to adopt any self-coherent maxims for possible actions. He is not, therefore, at the outset, prohibited from adopting, as a matter of contingent commitment, either altruistic or egoistic maxims, moral maxims or amoral maxims.
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On this basis, Gewirthians argue that dialectically necessary reasons (and only dialectically necessary reasons) for action are necessarily public. They do so, as I have shown, by arguing (using the ASA and the PRJ) that the FMP is dialectically necessary for Albert. Then, the fact that the PHI is dialectically necessary for Albert entails that he can only have (contingently) private reasons for action (ones serving his contingently chosen purposes) if there are some necessarily public reasons for action. Contingently private reasons must obey the PHI, which agents must comply with for an essentially public reason, to be able to think coherently that they are agents (that they have the capacity to do X voluntarily for an E that they have chosen).
The dialectically necessary (essentially public) commitments of agents, so justified, are strictly limited. When the argument reaches its conclusion, the only substantive dialectically necessary commitment that Albert and Brenda have is to defend their own and each other's possession of the GCAs from interference that is unwilled by the one whose possession of the GCAs is under threat. Albert is, therefore, completely free to decline to defend his possession of the GCAs or to invite interference by Brenda, provided only that he is willing to suffer generic damage to his ability to act and this does not lead to interference with other agents' (e.g., Carole's) having the GCAs against Carole's will. Similarly, Albert may choose to live his life according to a normative world-view of his own (a personal 'practical identity' to use Korsgaard's expression) 39 or one that he contingently shares with others that he takes to impose obligations on him that trump for him all considerations affecting his own welfare. This is consistent with the absolutely overriding nature of the PGC, because the PGC permits Albert to do anything at all provided only that this does not interfere with agents having the GCAs against their will.
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Korsgaard alleges that if the Gewirthian argument establishes that Albert must accept duties in relation to Brenda, these will not be duties to Brenda. This is false. By the ASA (interpreted in the light of the PRJ), Albert must accept that he has a duty not to interfere with Brenda's possession of the GCAs because she is an agent (possesses agency in her person). To be sure, he must think that he owes this duty to agency in Brenda's person because he possesses agency in his own person. But there is no difference between agency in his person and agency in Brenda's person. A duty Albert must accept if he is to think coherently that he possesses agency in his person is not a duty Albert must accept for the sake of the characteristics that make him the particular agent that he is. It is a duty he must accept in order to think that he has those characteristics that also make Brenda an agent (an intelligible addressor and addressee of practical precepts). Since it is only because he has these qualities that he can conceive of himself as the particular agent that he is, the force of what he (the particular agent that he is) must accept in order to conceive of himself as an agent can, in no way, be subject to whatever makes him the particular agent that he is, but is nevertheless binding on him as the particular agent that he is.
Furthermore, because {BR} Albert is the universalization (via the ASA) of {SROa} Albert and SROa requires Albert to defend his possession of the GCAs only if he wills to act, the duty that Albert must accept he has to Brenda consequent upon {BR} Albert is one that Brenda can release him from by exercise of her will. This entails that the duty Albert owes is a duty to the particular agent that Brenda is.
In short, the duty Albert owes in relation to Brenda he owes to the particular agent that Brenda is on account of his and her possession of agency in their persons.
Part Four: Korsgaard's Argument for Morality
This conclusion does not rely on any appeal of the kind Korsgaard makes to Wittgenstein. The rationally necessitated move to moral obligation requires nothing beyond Albert's selfunderstanding of what it is for him to be an agent (i.e., a particular agent). So, how does Korsgaard's 'argument for moral obligation' fit into this picture?
The argument she presents has the following form: .
(a) You make yourself a law to others (hence, you consider that others have an obligation not to torment you). What justifies morality in these sequences is (b)/(B), the proposition that humanity/agency is the ratio essendi for being a law to others/having the generic rights. 43 The way in which she uses Wittgenstein is neither able nor needed to establish that.
Korsgaard's appeal to Wittgenstein addresses a totally different problem. This is that even if you must assent to (a)-(c)/(A)-(C), for you to have to accept (d)/(D) (and therefore (e)/(E)) you must have to recognize that I am 'someone' (i.e., human/an agent). This problem arises in applying the moral law, not in establishing it.
Suppose that you accept that it is dialectically necessary for you to treat agents as a law to you. Nevertheless, when you interact with me, you fail to respect my humanity. When I object, you do not deny that agents are a law to you and that you are categorically bound to respect their humanity. What you claim is that, even though I behave like an agent, you do not know for certain that I am an agent (have a humanity to respect). This is because agents are self-conscious beings with the capacity to reason. The most you can know is that I behave like an agent. There is no inherent contradiction involved in your claim that I behave like an agent but am not one, nor is there a direct contradiction between your claim that you are an agent (which you know directly through your own self-consciousness) and your claim that I am not an agent (though I behave like one). So, you might contend, the fact that the Kantian/Gewirthian argument establishes that you are categorically bound not to torment any agent (according to Gewirthians, against the agent's will) does not categorically require you not to torment me.
Korsgaard's appeal to Wittgenstein does bear on this. Whether or not she can derive 'I categorically must treat those who behave like agents as agents' from Wittgenstein's argument I will not consider. In any case, I think that this proposition is true. However, my justification for this rests on it being dialectically necessary for me to consider that other agents have the generic rights. If this is so then when I am confronted by you, and you behave like an agent, I can either behave towards you as though you are an agent and treat you as having the generic rights or behave towards you as though you are not an agent and not treat you as having the generic rights. On the assumption that only I can know with certainty that I am an agent, I will not with certainty ever be able to know whether or not I have made a mistake, whichever course I choose. However, I know with certainty that if I assume that you are not an agent and I am wrong I have violated the categorical imperative. But, if I assume that you are an agent and I am wrong, I have not violated this imperative. Hence, provided that I can treat you as an agent (and I can if you have the capacity to behave like one, which you demonstrate by my capacity to hear your complaint as a complaint etc.) it is dialectically necessary for me to assume that you are an agent. 44 So, since the dialectical necessity for me to accept that you have the generic rights if you are an agent follows logically from it being dialectically necessary for me to consider 'I have the generic rights because I am an agent', there is also no need to appeal to Wittgenstein to establish that I categorically must treat you as an agent if you behave like one, even if such an appeal would suffice. 45 
